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Quantum broadcast communication
Jian Wang,∗ Quan Zhang, and Chao-jing Tang
School of Electronic Science and Engineering,
National University of Defense Technology,
Changsha, 410073, China
Broadcast encryption allows the sender to securely distribute his/her secret to a dynamically
changing group of users over a broadcast channel. In this paper, we just consider a simple broadcast
communication task in quantum scenario, which the central party broadcasts his secret to multi-
receiver via quantum channel. We present three quantum broadcast communication schemes. The
first scheme utilizes entanglement swapping and Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state to realize a task
that the central party broadcasts the secret to a group of receivers who share a group key with
him. In the second scheme, based on dense coding, the central party broadcasts the secret to
multi-receiver who share each of their authentication key with him. The third scheme is a quantum
broadcast communication scheme with quantum encryption, which the central party can broadcast
the secret to any subset of the legal receivers.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography has been one of the most re-
markable applications of quantum mechanics in quantum
information science. Quantum key distribution (QKD),
which provides a way of exchanging a private key with
unconditional security, has progressed rapidly since the
first QKD protocol was proposed by Benneett and Bras-
sard in 1984 [1]. A good many of other quantum commu-
nication schemes have also been proposed and pursued,
such as quantum secret sharing (QSS)[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7],
quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. QSS is the
generalization of classical secret sharing to quantum sce-
nario and can share both classical and quantum messages
among sharers. Many researches have been carried out
in both theoretical and experimental aspects after the
pioneering QSS scheme proposed by Hillery, Buzeˇk and
Berthiaume in 1999 [2]. Different from QKD, QSDC’s
object is to transmit the secret message directly without
first establishing a key to encrypt it. QSDC can be used
in some special environments which has been shown in
Ref. [9, 10]. The works on QSDC have attracted a great
deal of attention. Bostro¨m and Felbinger [9] proposed a
Ping-Pong protocol which is quasi-secure for secure direct
communication if perfect quantum channel is used. Deng
et al. [10, 11] put forward a two-step QSDC protocol us-
ing Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs and a QSDC
scheme by using batches of single photons which serves
as quantum one-time pad cryptosystem. We proposed a
multiparty controlled QSDC scheme using Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state and a QSDC scheme based
on the order rearrangement of single photons [15, 16].
Lee et al. [21] presented two QSDC protocols with user
authentication. Recently, some multiparty quantum di-
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rect communication schemes which are used to realize
the task that many users send each of their secrets to a
central party have been proposed. Gao et al. [23] pro-
posed a QSDC scheme using GHZ states and entangle-
ment swapping. In their scheme, the secret messages can
be transmitted from two senders to a remote receiver.
They also presented a simultaneous QSDC scheme be-
tween the central party and other M parties using GHZ
states, which the M parties can transmit each of their
secret messages to the central party simultaneously [24].
Jin et al. [25] put forward a simultaneous QSDC scheme
by using GHZ states and dense coding.
Broadcast encryption involves a sender and multi-user
(receiver) [26]. The sender first encrypts his content and
then transmits it to a dynamically changing set of users
via insecure broadcasting channels. The broadcast en-
cryption scheme assures that only privileged receivers
can recover the content subscribed and the unauthorized
users cannot learn anything. In this paper, we consider
a simple broadcast encryption task in quantum scenario,
called quantum broadcast communication (QBC), which
the central party broadcasts his secret message to a group
of legal receivers via quantum channel and any illegal re-
ceiver cannot obtain the central party’s secret. We then
consider a naive scheme that the sender first establishes a
common key with multi-user and then encrypts the secret
with the sharing key. Thus the multi-user can obtain the
sender’s secret by decrypting the cypher with the key. In
the present schemes, we try to allow the sender broadcast
the secret to multi-user directly without first establishing
a common key to encrypt it. We then present three QBC
schemes based on the ideas in Ref. [21, 24, 25, 27]. In
scheme 1, a group of users share a group key with the
central party. After authenticating the users, the central
party broadcasts his secret message to them by using en-
tanglement swapping [28]. In scheme 2, each user shares
a authentication key with the central party. The central
party first authenticates the users and then broadcasts
the secret to them by using dense coding [29]. In scheme
23, based on quantum encryption [27], the central party
utilizes controlled-not (CNOT) operation to encrypt his
secret qubit by using the particle in GHZ state and the
designated users also use CNOT operation to decrypt the
central party’s secret.
The aim of QBC is to broadcast the secret to legal
multi-user directly. In our schemes, we suppose a trusted
third party, Trent, broadcasts his secret to r legal users,
Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer. Similar to Ref. [21], Trent
shares a secret identity number IDi (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) and
a secret hash function hi (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) with each user.
Only the users’ identities are legal can Trent broadcast
his secret to them. Here the hash function is
h : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, (1)
where l, m and n denote the length of the identity num-
ber, the length of a counter and the length of authenti-
cation key, respectively. Thus the user’s authentication
key can be expressed as AK = h(ID,C), where C is the
counter of calls on the user’s hash function. When the
length of the authentication key is not enough to satisfy
the requirement of cryptographic task. The parties can
increase the counter and then generates a new authenti-
cation key. We denote the authentication keys of Alice1,
Alice2, · · · , Alicer as AKA1 = hA1(IDA1 , CA1), AKA2 =
hA2(IDA2 , CA2), · · · , AKAr = hAr(IDAr , CAr ).
We then give some relations which will be used in our
schemes. The four Bell states and the eight three-particle
GHZ states are defined as
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), |φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉),
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉), (2)
and
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉), |Ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉),
|Ψ3〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉+ |011〉), |Ψ4〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉 − |011〉),
|Ψ5〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉+ |101〉), |Ψ6〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉 − |101〉),
|Ψ7〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉+ |001〉), |Ψ8〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉 − |001〉),
(3)
respectively. The four unitary operations which can be
encoded as two bits classical information are
I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|,
iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|,
σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|. (4)
Here the encoding is defined as I → 00, σx → 01, iσy →
10, σz → 11. The Hadamard (H) operation is
H =
1√
2
(|0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|+ |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|). (5)
II. SCHEME1: QUANTUM BROADCAST
COMMUNICATION USING ENTANGLEMENT
SWAPPING
In scheme 1, Trent utilizes multi-particle GHZ states
and entanglement swapping to realize quantum broad-
cast communication, called QBC-ES.We first present our
QBC-ES scheme with two users (Alice1, Alice2) and then
generalize it to the case with many users (Alice1, Alice2,
· · · , Alicer). In the scheme, Trent broadcasts his secret
message to a group of users and all users have the same
authentication key which we call group key (GK).
(S1) Trent prepares an ordered N three-particle GHZ
states each of which is in the state |Ψ1〉 = 1√2 (|000〉 +
|111〉)TA1A2 , where the subscripts T , A1 and A2 repre-
sent the three particles of each GHZ state. Trent takes
particle T (A1, A2) for each state to form an ordered
particle sequence, called T (A1, A2) sequence. For each
GHZ state, Trent performs I or H operation on particles
A1 and A2 according to the group key, GK. If the ith
value of GK is 0 (1), he performs I (H) operation on
particles A1 and A2. As we have described in Sec. I,
here GK = h(ID,C). If the length of GK is not long
enough to N , new GK can be generated by increasing
the counter until the length of GK is no less than N .
Trent also performs randomly one of the two operations
{I, iσy} on particle A1. He then sends A1 and A2 se-
quences to Alice1 and Alice2, respectively.
(S2) After receiving A1 and A2 sequences, Alice1 and
Alice2 perform corresponding I or H operations on each
of their particles according to GK. For example, if the
ith value of GK is 0 (1), Alice1 executes I (H) opera-
tion on particle A1. They inform Trent that they have
transformed their qubit using unitary operation accord-
ing to GK. Trent then authenticates the users and checks
eavesdropping during the transmission of A1 and A2 se-
quences.
(S3) The procedure of authentication and eavesdrop-
ping check is as follows. (a) After hearing from the
users, Trent selects randomly a sufficiently large subset
from the ordered N GHZ states. (b) He measures the
sampling particles in T sequence, in a random measur-
ing basis, Z-basis(|0〉,|1〉) or X-basis (|+〉= 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉),
|−〉= 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉)). (c) Trent announces publicly the po-
sitions of the sampling particles and the measuring basis
for each of the sampling particles. Alice1 (Alice2) mea-
sures the sampling particles in A1 (A2) sequence, in the
same measuring basis as Trent. After measurements, the
users publishes their measurement results. (d) Trent can
then authenticate the users and check the existence of
eavesdropper by comparing their measurement results.
If the users are legal and the channel is safe, their results
must be completely correlated. Suppose Trent’s opera-
tion performed on particle A1 is I. When Trent performs
Z-basis measurement on his particle, Alices’ result should
be |00〉 (|11〉) if Trent’s result is |0〉 (|1〉). On the con-
trary, Alices’ result should be |++〉 or | − −〉 (|+−〉
3or | −+〉) if Trent performs X-basis measurement on his
particle and gets the result |+〉 (|−〉). Thus if Trent con-
firms that the users are legal and there is no eavesdrop-
ping, they continue to execute the next step. Otherwise,
he aborts the communication.
(S4) After authenticating the users, Trent announces
publicly his random operations on the particles in A1
sequence and Alice1 performs the same operations on
them. Trent divides the remaining GHZ states into M
ordered groups, {P(1)TA1A2 , Q(1)T ′A′1A′2}, {P(2)TA1A2 ,
Q(2)T ′A′
1
A′
2
}, · · · , {P(M)TA1A2 , Q(M)T ′A′1A′2}, where 1,
2, · · · , M represent the order of the group and the sub-
scripts T and T ′ (A1, A′1 and A2, A
′
2) denote Trent’s
(Alice1’s and Alice2’s ) particles. Trent encodes his se-
cret on each particle T by using one of the four operations
{I, σx, iσy, σz}. The parties agree that the four opera-
tions represent two-bit classical message, as we have de-
scribed in Sec.I. Alice1 generates aM -bit random string,
a1. For each group, she performs one of the two unitary
operations {I, σx} on particle A1 according to a1. For
example, if the ith value of a1 is 0 (1), Alice1 executes
I (σx) operation on particle A1. Here Alice1 does not
perform any operation on particle A′1.
(S5) Alice1 (Alice2) measures particles A1 and A
′
1 (A2
and A′2) of each group in Bell basis. After measurements,
Alice1 publishes her measurement results, but Alice2 does
not do this directly. According to GK, Alice2 transforms
her result by using corresponding unitary operation. If
the (2i− 1)th and 2ith values of GK are 00 (01, 10, 11),
she performs I (σx, iσy, σz) operation on her result and
then publishes the transformed result. If Alice2’s result
is |φ+〉 and the corresponding bits of GK are 01, the
published result by her is |ψ+〉.
(S6) Trent performs Bell basis measurement on parti-
cles T and T ′ of each group and publishes his measure-
ment results. According to the published information,
the users can obtain Trent’s secret message. We then
explain it in detail. The state of a group can be written
as
|Ψ1〉TA1A2 ⊗ |Ψ1〉T ′A′1A′2 =
1
2
√
2
(|φ+TT ′ 〉|φ+A1A′1〉|φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉
+|φ+TT ′〉|φ−A1A′1〉|φ
−
A2A
′
2
〉
+|φ−TT ′〉|φ+A1A′1〉|φ
−
A2A
′
2
〉+ |φ−TT ′ 〉|φ−A1A′1〉|φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉
+|ψ+TT ′〉|ψ+A1A′1〉|ψ
+
A2A
′
2
〉+ |ψ+TT ′ 〉|ψ−A1A′1〉|ψ
−
A2A
′
2
〉
+|ψ−TT ′〉|ψ+A1A′1〉|ψ
−
A2A
′
2
〉+ |ψ−TT ′〉|ψ−A1A′1〉|ψ
+
A2A
′
2
〉).(6)
If Trent’s encoding operation is σx which corresponds to
secret bits 01 and Alice1’s random operation is also σx
corresponding to bit 1, |Ψ1〉TA1A2 is then transformed to
|Ψ7〉TA1A2 and the state of the group becomes
|Ψ7〉TA1A2 ⊗ |Ψ1〉T ′A′1A′2 =
1
2
√
2
(|ψ+TT ′〉|ψ+A1A′1〉|φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉
−|ψ+TT ′〉|ψ−A1A′1〉|φ
−
A2A
′
2
〉
−|ψ−TT ′〉|ψ+A1A′1〉|φ
−
A2A
′
2
〉+ |ψ−TT ′〉|ψ−A1A′1〉|φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉
+|φ+TT ′〉|φ+A1A′1〉|ψ
+
A2A
′
2
〉 − |φ+TT ′〉|φ−A1A′1〉|ψ
−
A2A
′
2
〉
−|φ−TT ′〉|φ+A1A′1〉|ψ
−
A2A
′
2
〉+ |φ−TT ′ 〉|φ−A1A′1〉|ψ
+
A2A
′
2
〉).(7)
From the results of Trent and Alice1, Alice2 can deduce
Trent’s secret message because the three parties’ results
correspond to an exclusive state. For example, the re-
sults of Trent and Alice1 are each |ψ−TT ′〉 and |ψ−A1A′1〉 and
Alice2’s original result is |φ+A2A′2〉. According to Eq. (7),
the state of the group must be |Ψ7〉TA1A2⊗|Ψ1〉T ′A′1A′2 .
Alice2 then knows Trent’s secret must be “01” because
only the operation σx⊗σx applied on particles T and A1
can change the state |Ψ1〉 into |Ψ7〉. On the other hand,
Alice1 knows GK and she can deduce Alice2’s original
result according to her published result. Similarly, she
can also obtain Trent’s secret. Thus Trent broadcasts
his secret to two legal users.
Now, let us discuss the security for the present scheme.
The security requirement for the scheme is that any il-
legal user cannot obtain Trent’s secret. As long as the
procedure of authentication and eavesdropping check is
secure, the whole scheme is secure. Anyone who has no
GK cannot obtain Trent’s secret message because it is
impossible to deduce a definite result about the secret
from the published results. We then discuss the security
for the procedure of authentication and eavesdropping
check.
At step (S1), Trent performs I or H operation on par-
ticles A1 and A2 according to GK which is only shared
by the three parties. If the ith bit of GK is 0 or 1, the
three-particle GHZ state becomes
|Φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) = 1√
2
(|+〉|φ+〉+ |−〉|φ−〉)
=
1
2
[|+〉(|++〉+ | − −〉) + |−〉(|+ −〉+ | −+〉)]
(8)
or
|Φ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0 + +〉+ |1−−〉) = 1√
2
(|+〉|φ+〉+ |−〉|ψ+〉)
=
1
2
[|+〉(|++〉+ | − −〉) + |−〉(|++〉 − | − −〉)].(9)
According to Eqs. (8) and (9), if an eavesdropper, Eve,
intercepts particles A1 and A2 and makes a Bell basis
measurement on them, she can obtain partial information
of GK. However, Trent performs random I or iσy oper-
ation on particle A1, which can prevent Eve from eaves-
dropping the information of GK. As a result of Trent’s
4operation, there are four possible states |Φ1〉, |Φ2〉,
|Φ3〉 = 1√
2
(−|010〉+ |101〉) = 1√
2
(|+〉|ψ−〉 − |−〉|ψ+〉)
=
1
2
[|+〉(| −+〉 − |+−〉)− |−〉(|++〉 − | − −〉)]
(10)
and
|Φ4〉 = 1√
2
(|0 −+〉 − |1 +−〉) = 1√
2
(|+〉|ψ−〉+ |−〉|φ−〉)
=
1
2
[|+〉(| −+〉 − |+−〉) + |−〉(|+−〉+ | −+〉)].
(11)
According to Eqs. (8)-(11), Eve cannot distinguish the
four states by using Bell basis measurement. During the
authentication and eavesdropping check, Trent measures
his sampling particles in Z-basis or X-basis randomly
and allows the users to measure their corresponding par-
ticles in the same measuring basis. Suppose Trent per-
forms Z-basis measurement on his particle and Eve also
measures particles A1 and A2 in Z-basis. Eve publishes
her measurement result after measurements. If the state
is |Φ1〉 or |Φ3〉, Eve will not introduce any error during
the process of authentication and eavesdropping check.
However, If the state is |Φ2〉 and |Φ4〉, Eve will obtain
|00〉, |01〉, |10〉 and |11〉 each with probability 1/4 and
the error rate introduced by her achieves 75%. Similarly,
when Trent performsX-basis measurement and Eve mea-
sures particles A1 and A2 in the same measuring basis, if
the state is |Φ2〉 or |Φ4〉, Eve will not introduce any error.
But if the state is |Φ1〉 and |Φ3〉, Eve will obtains |++〉,
|+−〉, | −+〉 and | − −〉 each with probability 1/4 and
the error rate is 50%. Suppose Trent performs X-basis
measurement and Eve measures particles A1 and A2 in
Bell basis. When Eve’s result is |φ+〉 (|ψ−〉), her action
will not be detected by Trent if she publishes the result
|++〉 or | − −〉 (|+−〉 or | −+〉). However, when her
result is |φ−〉 (|ψ+〉), if the state is |Φ4〉 (|Φ3〉), Trent will
detect Eve’s eavesdropping. Similarly, if Trent performs
Z-basis measurement and Eve executes Bell basis mea-
surement, Eve’s eavesdropping will also be detected by
Trent with a certain probability.
According to Stinespring dilation theorem, Eve’s ac-
tion can be realized by a unitary operation Eˆ on a large
Hilbert space, HA1A2 ⊗ HE . Then the state of Trent,
Alice1, Alice1 and Eve is
|Φ〉 =
∑
T,A1,A2∈{0,1}
|εT,A1,A2〉|T 〉|A1A2〉, (12)
where |ε〉 denotes Eve’s probe state and |T 〉 and |A1A2〉
are states shared by Trent and the users. The condition
on the states of Eve’s probe is
∑
T,A1,A2∈{0,1}
〈εT,A1,A2 | εT,A1,A2〉 = 1. (13)
As Eve can eavesdrop particle A1 and A2, Eve’s action
on the system can be written as
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉(α1|00〉|ε000〉+ β1|01〉|ε001〉+ γ1|10〉|ε010〉
+ δ1|11〉|ε011〉) + |1〉(δ2|11〉|ε100〉+ γ2|10〉|ε101〉
+ β2|01〉|ε110〉+ α2|00〉|ε111〉]. (14)
When the state is |Φ1〉, the error rate introduced by Eve
is ǫ = 1 − |α1|2 = 1 − |δ2|2. Here the complex numbers
α, β, γ and δ must satisfy EˆEˆ† = I.
We then generalize the three-party QBC-ES scheme
to a multiparty one (more than three parties). Suppose
Trent wants to broadcast his secret to a group of users,
{Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer}. He prepares an ordered N
(r + 1)-particle GHZ states
1√
2
(|00 · · · 0〉+ |11 · · ·1〉)T,A1,··· ,Ar . (15)
The details of the multiparty QBC-ES is very similar
to those of three-party one. Trent performs I or H
operations on particles A1, A2, · · · , Ar according to
GK they shares. He also performs randomly I or iσy
operation on particles A1, A2, · · · , A(r−1) and sends
A1, A2, · · · , Ar sequences to each Alice1, Alice2, · · · ,
Alicer. After receiving the particles, each user performs
I or H operations on their particles according to GK.
Similar to step (S3), Trent authenticates the users and
checks eavesdropping. If all users are legal, he announces
publicly his operations on particles A1, A2, · · · , A(r−1)
and Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alice(r−1) execute the same op-
erations on them. Trent divides all GHZ states into
N ordered groups, [{P(1)TA1···Ar , Q(1)T ′A′1···A′r}, · · · ,{P(N)TA1···Ar , Q(N)T ′A′1···A′r}]. He encodes his secret
on particles T using one of the four operations, {I,
σx, iσy, σz}. Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alice(r−1) each per-
form randomly one of the two operations {I, σx} on
their particles. Each user measures particles Ai and
A′i (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) in Bell basis. After measurements,
Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alice(r−1) publish their measurement
results. Alicer first transforms her result according to
GK and then publishes the transformed result. Trent
also performs Bell basis measurement on particles T and
T ′ of each group. Thus Trent broadcasts his secret to all
legal users, Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alice(r − 1) and Alicer.
The security for multiparty QBC-ES scheme is similar
to that for three-party one. As long as the procedure
of authentication and eavesdropping check is secure, the
scheme is secure.
Based on entanglement swapping, we can also ob-
tain a multiparty simultaneous quantum authentication
scheme using multi-particle GHZ state. Here each user
shares each of their authentication keys with Trent.
Trent prepares a batch of GHZ states 1√
2
(|00 · · · 0〉 +
|11 · · ·1〉)t,1,2,··· ,r. For each GHZ state, he sends particles
1, 2, 3, · · · , r to Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer, respectively
and keeps particle t. Similar to the above method, he
5divides all GHZ states into ordered groups and performs
randomly one of the two unitary operations { I, iσy} on
particle t. Each Alicei (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) performs I or iσy
operation on their particles according to their authen-
tication keys. Similarly, the parties perform Bell basis
measurements on their particles of each group. Trent
lets the users publish their measurement results and can
then authenticate the r users simultaneously.
III. SCHEME2: QUANTUM BROADCAST
COMMUNICATION BASED ON DENSE CODING
In the scheme 1, Trent can only broadcast secret to a
group of users who share a GK with him. Based on dense
coding, we present a quantum broadcast communication
scheme, called QBC-DC scheme, which Trent broadcasts
his secret to multi-user {Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer} and
the users shares each of their authentication keys with
Trent. We first present a three-party QBC-DC scheme
and then generate it to a multiparty one.
(S1) Trent prepares an ordered N three-particle
GHZ states randomly in one of the eight GHZ states
{|Ψ1〉TA1A2 ,|Ψ2〉TA1A2 ,· · · ,|Ψ7〉TA1A2}, where the sub-
scripts T , A1 and A2 represent three particles of each
GHZ state. He takes particle T from each of the GHZ
states to form an ordered particle sequence, called T se-
quence. Similarly, the remaining partner particles com-
pose A1 sequence and A2 sequence. Trent performs one
of the two operations {I, H} on each particle in A1 se-
quence according to Alice1’s authentication key, AKA1 .
Here AKA1 = hA1(IDA1 , CA1). That is, if the ith value
of AKA1 is 0 (1), he performs I (H) operation on particle
A1. Trent also executes I or H operation on particle A2
according to Alice2’s authentication key, AKA2 . After
doing these, he sends A1 and A2 sequences to Alice1 and
Alice2, respectively.
(S2) Alice1 (Alice2) performs corresponding I or H
operation on each of her particles according to AKA1
(AKA2). For example, if the ith value of AKA1 is 0 (1),
I (H) operation is applied to particle A1. After doing
these, they inform Trent. Trent then authenticates the
users and checks eavesdropping during the transmission
of A1 and A2 sequences.
(S3) We then describe the procedure of authentication
and eavesdropping check in detail. (a) Trent selects ran-
domly a sufficiently large subset from the ordered GHZ
states. (b) He measures the sampling particles in T se-
quence in Z-basis or X-basis randomly. (c) Trent an-
nounces publicly the positions of the sampling particles
and the measuring basis for each of the sampling photons.
Alice1 and Alice2 measure their sampling particles in the
same basis as Trent. After measurements, the users pub-
lishes their measurement results. (d) Trent can authen-
ticate the users and check the existence of eavesdropper
by comparing their measurement results. If the users are
legal and the channel is safe, their results must be com-
pletely correlated. For example, the initial state is |Ψ1〉.
Suppose Trent performs Z-basis measurement on parti-
cle T . If Trent’s result is |0〉 (|1〉), the users’ results must
be |00〉 (|11〉). If Trent performs X-basis measurement
on his particle and gets the result |+〉 (|−〉), the users’
results should be |++〉 or | − −〉 (|+−〉 or | −+〉). If
any user is illegal, Trent abandons the communication.
Otherwise, they continue to the next step.
(S4) Alice1 and Alice2 each generate a random string,
a1 and a2. According to their random strings, they per-
form one of the two unitary operations {I, iσy} on par-
ticles A1 and A2, respectively. For example, if the ith
value of Alice1’s random string is 0 (1), she performs I
(iσy) operation on particle A1. After their operations,
they return A1 and A2 sequences to Trent.
(S5) Trent selects randomly a sufficiently large subset
from the ordered GHZ states and performs randomly one
of the four unitary operations { I, σx, iσy, σz} on each of
the sampling particles in T sequence. He then encodes his
secret message on the remaining particles T by perform-
ing one of the four unitary operations on each of them.
Trent measures particles T , A1 and A2 of each GHZ state
in three-particle GHZ basis. He announces publicly the
positions of the sampling particles and lets each user pub-
lish their corresponding random operations on the sam-
pling particles in A1 and A2 sequences. According to his
measurement result, Trent can check the security for the
transmission of the returned particle sequences. When
the initial state is |Ψ1〉, his result is |Ψ8〉 and his op-
eration on particle T is σx, he can deduce Alice1’s and
Alice2’s operations are each iσy and I. He then compares
his conclusion with the operations published by the users
and can decide the security for the transmitting parti-
cles. If he confirms that there is no eavesdropping, he
publishes his measurement results and the initial GHZ
states he prepared. Alice1 and Alice2 can then obtain
Trent’s secret. For example, when the initial state is
|Ψ1〉 and Trent’s operation is σx (corresponds to his se-
cret 01), |Ψ1〉 is transformed to |Ψ8〉, if Alice1 and Alice2
perform iσy and I operations on particles A1 and A2,
respectively. That is, σx⊗iσy⊗I|Ψ1〉=|Ψ8〉. According
to her operation performed on particle A1 (A2), Trent’s
result |Ψ8〉 and the initial state |Ψ1〉, Alice1 (Alice2) can
obtains Trent’s secret message, 01.
The security for the three-party QBC-DC scheme is
based on that for the procedure of authentication and
eavesdropping check. Trent prepares an ordered N GHZ
states each of which is in one of the eight GHZ states
and performs I or H operation on particle A1 and A2
according to each user’s authentication key. For each
initial state, there are four possible states after Trent’s
operations. For example, the initial state is |Ψ1〉, then
6the four possible states are
|Ω1〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉),
|Ω2〉 = 1√
2
(|0 + 0〉+ |1− 1〉),
=
1
2
[|+〉(|φ−〉+ |ψ+〉) + |−〉(|φ+〉 − |ψ−〉)]
|Ω3〉 = 1√
2
(|00+〉+ |11−〉),
=
1
2
[|+〉(|φ−〉+ |ψ+〉) + |−〉(|φ+〉+ |ψ−〉)]
|Ω4〉 = 1√
2
(|0 + +〉+ |1−−〉). (16)
Eve has no information of the user’s authentication key.
If Eve intercepts particles A1 and A2 and performs Bell
basis measurement on them, she cannot obtain the infor-
mation of the user’s authentication key because she can-
not distinguish the four states. During the procedure of
authentication and eavesdropping check, Trent performs
randomly Z-basis or X-basis measurement on his parti-
cle. When Trent performs Z-basis measurement and Eve
measures the intercepted particles in the same measuring
basis as Trent, if the state is not |Ω1〉, it is possible for
her to publish a wrong result after measurements. Simi-
larly, whether Eve utilizes Z-basis, X-basis or Bell basis
measurement, she will publish a wrong result with some
probability and her action will be detected by Trent dur-
ing the procedure of authentication and eavesdropping
check. We can also describe Eve’s effect on the system
as Eq. (14). If the initial state is |Ψ5〉, the error rate
introduced by Eve is ǫ = 1− |γ1|2.
We then generalize the three-party QBC-DC scheme
to a multiparty (more than three parties) one which
Trent broadcasts his secret to r users {Alice1, Alice2,
· · · , Alicer}. He prepares an ordered N GHZ states each
of which is randomly in one of the 2(r+1) (r+1)-particle
GHZ states
1√
2
(|ij · · · k〉+ |¯ij¯ · · · k¯〉)T,A1,··· ,Ar , (17)
where i, j, · · · , k ∈ {0, 1} and i¯, j¯, · · · , k¯ are the counter-
parts of i, j, · · · , k. The details of the multiparty QBC-
DC is very similar to those of three-party one. Trent per-
forms I or H operations on each particle in A1 ( A2, · · · ,
Ar) sequence according to AKA1 (AKA2 , · · · , AKAr ). He
then sends A1, A2, · · · , Ar sequences to Alice1, Alice2,
· · · , Alicer, respectively. After receiving the particle se-
quence, each user performs I or H operations on their
particles according to their respective authentication key.
Similar to step (S3) in the three-party QBC-DC scheme,
Trent authenticates the users and checks eavesdropping.
If any user is illegal, Trent aborts communication, oth-
erwise, they continue to the next step. Alice1, Alice2,
· · · , Alicer perform randomly I or iσy operation on their
respective particles. After doing these, they return A1,
A2, · · · , Ar sequences to Trent. Trent first chooses a suf-
ficiently large subset to check the security for the trans-
mitting particles and performs randomly one of the four
operations on the sampling particles in T sequence. He
also encodes his secret on the remaining particles in T
sequence using the four operations. Trent measures each
of (r+1)-particle GHZ states in (r+1)-particle GHZ ba-
sis. He publishes the positions of the sampling particles
and lets the users announce publicly their operations on
the sampling particles. Trent can then check the security
for the transmission of the returned particle sequences.
If there is no eavesdropping, he publishes his measure-
ment results and the initial (r + 1)-particle GHZ states
she prepared. Thus Trent broadcasts his secret to Alice1,
Alice2, · · · , Alicer.
IV. SCHEME 3: QUANTUM BROADCAST
COMMUNICATION BASED ON QUANTUM
ENCRYPTION
In scheme 2, Trent broadcasts his secret to a group
of designated users. We then present a QBC scheme
with quantum encryption, called QBC-QE scheme, which
Trent can broadcast his secret to any subset of the users.
The details of the QBC-QE scheme are as follows.
(S1) Trent prepares an ordered N (r+1)-particle GHZ
states each of which is in the state
1√
2
(|00 · · · 0〉+ |11 · · ·1〉)T,A1,··· ,Ar . (18)
The N particles T form T sequence and the N particles
Ai (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) form Ai sequence. Trent performs
one of the two operations {I, H} on the particles in Ai
sequence according to Alicei’s authentication key. That
is, if Alicei’s AKAi is 0 (1), Trent performs I (H) on
particle Ai. Trent sends A1, A2, · · · , Ar sequences to
Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer, respectively.
(S2) Alicei (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) performs corresponding
I or H operation on each of her particles according to
AKAi . Similar to the method of step (S3) in QBC-DC
scheme, Trent authenticates the users and checks eaves-
dropping by performing random Z-basis or X-basis mea-
surement. If the users are legal and the channel is safe,
they continue to the next step. Otherwise, Trent stops
the communication.
(S3) Trent utilizes controlled-not (CNOT) operation
to encrypt his secret message. For example, Trent trans-
mits his secret P = {p1, p2, · · · , pm}, where pi ∈ {0, 1}
(i = 1, 2, · · · ,m) represents classical bit 0 or 1, to two
users {Alicej, Alicek} (1 ≤ j, k ≤ r). He prepares his se-
cret in the state |pipi〉SjSk , where Sj , Sk denote the two
particles of the state. Trent performs CNOT operation
on particles T , Sj and Sk (particle T is the controller and
Sj and Sk are the targets). Then the GHZ state of the
7whole quantum system becomes
|Υ〉 = 1√
2
(|00 · · · 0, pi, pi〉
+ |11 · · ·1, 1⊕ pi, 1⊕ pi〉)T,A1,··· ,Ar,Sj ,Sk . (19)
According to Alicej ’s and Alicek’s authentication keys,
Trent performs corresponding I or H operation on par-
ticles Sj and Sk. For example, if the ith value of Alicej ’s
authentication key is 0 (1), he performs I (H) operation
on particle Sj. Here we denote the operation performed
on Sj (Sk) as HAKi
Aj
(HAKi
Ak
), where AKiAj (AK
i
Ak
)
represents the ith value of Alicej ’s (Alicek’s) authentica-
tion key and H0 (H1) represents I (H) operation. Thus
|Υ〉 is transformed to
|Υ′〉 = 1√
2
[|00 · · ·0, HAKi
Aj
(pi), HAKi
Ak
(pi)〉+ |11 · · ·1,
HAKi
Aj
(1⊕ pi), HAKi
Ak
(1⊕ pi)〉]T,A1,··· ,Ar,Sj ,Sk .
(20)
Trent then sends Sj and Sk sequences to Alicej and
Alicek, respectively. To insure the security of the trans-
mission of Sj and Sk sequences, Trent should insert ran-
domly some sampling particles into Sj and Sk sequences
before sending them to the users. The aim of inserting
the sampling particles is to make the parties detect Eve’s
disturbance attack although Eve cannot obtain any in-
formation of Trent’s secret message.
(S4) After receiving Sj (Sk) sequence, Alicej (Alicek)
first performs corresponding I or H operation on the
transmitting particles according to AKAj (AKAk) and
then executes CNOT operation on particles Aj (Ak) and
Sj (Sk). For example, if the ith value of Alicej ’s au-
thentication key is 1, she performs H operation on the
corresponding particle in Sj sequence and does CNOT
operation on particles Aj and Sj (Aj is the controller
and Sj is the target). According to Eq.(19) and (20),
Alicej and Alicek can obtain Trent’s secret message.
In the above scheme, we just give an example of send-
ing secret to any two users of r users. Obviously, Trent
can send his secret to any subset of the legal users in the
scheme. Strictly speaking, the present scheme is not a
genuine QBC scheme because Trent must transmit a par-
ticle sequence to each user. In view of Trent can transmit
his secret to multi-user directly in this scheme, we still
regard it as QBC. The security for authentication and
eavesdropping check in the scheme is the same as that
in QBC-DC scheme. After confirming the users are legal
and insuring the security of the quantum channel, the
GHZ states can be regarded as quantum key. Trent can
then encrypt his secret message using quantum key they
share. If Trent wants to transmit his secret to a subset
of the users, he then performs I or H operation on the
encoding particles according to each designated user’s au-
thentication key, which ensures that only the users in this
subset can obtain Trent’s secret. After insuring the se-
curity for the transmitting particles, the designated user
decrypts the secret by using quantum key. The proce-
dure of encryption and decryption in our scheme is the
same as quantum one-time pad, but the quantum key is
the GHZ states shared by the parties. In the scheme, the
quantum key can be used repeatedly for next round of
cryptographic task.
V. SUMMARY
In summary, we have presented three schemes for quan-
tum broadcast communication. In our schemes, Trent
broadcasts his secret message to multi-user directly and
only the legal users can obtain Trent’s secret. In scheme
1, based on the idea in Ref. [24], we utilizes entanglement
swapping to realize a QBC scheme which Trent sends his
secret to a group of users who share a group key with
Trent. In scheme 2, based on the idea in Ref. [25], we
present a QBC scheme that Trent broadcasts his secret
to multi-user who share each of their authentication keys
with Trent, by using dense coding. Scheme 3 is based
on quantum encryption [27], which Trent can broadcast
his secret to any subset of the legal users. Because our
schemes utilize block transmission, quantum memory is
necessary. Moreover, compared with classical broadcast
encryption which allows the sender to securely distribute
the secret to a dynamically changing group of users, the
present schemes are not genuine quantum broadcast en-
cryption schemes. That is why we call them quantum
broadcast communication schemes. We hope that our
work will attract more attention and give impetus to fur-
ther research on quantum broadcast communication.
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